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T he existence of pornography from theearliest times and in virtually every
culture attests to a remarkable universality
and persistence. Of course, popularity is no
proof of legitimacy. How, if at all, can
pornography be justified? This question
has no easy answer. Indeed, if one may
judge from the controversy, consensus is
far from being reached on the question of
pornography. I shall suggest some things
that can be said in favor of pornography,
though I am by no means giving my unquali-
fied endorsement -- hence, only two cheers
for pornography. Naturally, I expect some
readers to disagree with me, so I will also
explain why recent objections to pornog-
raphy either neglect or obscure the issues.
The Value of Pornography
In attempting to justify pornography,
let's first consider its value. It will be
obvious to anyone who has read Hustler
magazine or seen the film Deep Throat that
pornography has a limited and narrowly
focused appeal. It caters to the desire to
read about or view sexual display and
activity. Consequently, pornography can
be a benefit to those who have such a desire.
By a "benefit" I mean something that is
itself, or leads to, an experience which
anyone who cares about himself or herself
may reasonably want. Now, pornography is
beneficial in a number of ways: as a means
of employment, as a tool in therapy, as an
escape from boredom. However, its main
claim to beneficiality is as a source of
entertainment and recreation -- it gives
people pleasure.
What, then, are the pleasures of pornog-
raphy? There is first the pleasure of viewing
persons we find attractive and activity we
find entertaining. And there is of course the
pleasure of sexual desire itself. Closely tied
to this is the pleasure of the recognition of
the intention that one be sexually aroused,
a pleasure not confined to pornography,
but found also in flirtation and other forms
of sexual play. In pornography, sexual
ar'ousal is produced by means of the read-
er's or viewer's recognition of the intention
to produce this effect. This gives pornogra-
phy a structure of reflexive recognition and
thus helps to explain how pornography as a
representation of something might fall under
freedom of expression protection. Then
there are the pleasures for which pornogra-
phy is often an impetus, pleasures which
have their locus in consensual sexual activi-
ty. In addition to these benefits, reading or
viewing pornography can be a profoundly
normative experience, causing us to con-
sider what it means to be human. The
distinctively human activities and practices




least, a certain meretricious buoyancy: they
stimulate the imagination and provoke
both the moral and aesthetic conscious-
ness. They open us to new erotic possibil-
ities, challenging us to reflect upon our
ideas of beauty, normality, and sexuality.
There are, of course, alternative sources
of these experiences, as well as alternative
experiences. What is more, the experiences
to which pornography is instrumental are
by no means the sole benefits in life. But
that they are benefits seems indisputable,
and one could only question them by
referring to other values with which they
might conflict.
Pornography and Feminist Ideology
The suggestion that pornography is bene-
ficial is not new, but it is one that many
people are accustomed to dismiss very
casually. Discussions of pornography
tend to neglect its benefits and concentrate
on its alleged harms. Most recently, radical
feminists have argued vociferously that
pornography is harmful to women, and
have proposed legislation in Minneapolis,
Indianapolis, and Cambridge that would
give a woman grounds to sue anyone who
had anything to do with the manufacture or
sale of material she thought degraded her.
These proposals have met with some suc-
cess, and the momentum clearly seems to
be with anti-pornography activists. I have
little sympathy with their approach --
though I support the aim to eradicate anti-
female violence -- for reasons which will be
clear shortly. But let me note here that the
assumption of a direct causal connection
between exposure to pornographic mater-
ials and violence against women has not, to
date, been justified by reliable empirical
studies. While the preponderance of evi-
dence fails to support any such direct causal
connection, the controversy continues.
A major problem for those who advocate
censoring pornography is defining terms.
What does it mean to say that something is
pornographic? What makes a magazine or
film pornographic? How are we to define
pornography? If we cannot answer these
questions, how can we possibly give any
meaning to the concept of pornography?
According to some liberals and free-speech
absolutists, this is precisely what we cannot
do. But before embracing any hasty conclu-
sions, let's look at the way the 1970
Presidential Commission on Obscenity and
Pornography dealt with the problem. Es-
chewing such highly emotive terms as 'por-
nography' and 'obscenity,' they instead
used terms and expressions such as 'ero-
tica,' 'explicit sexual materials,' and 'sex-
ually oriented materials.' Whatever prob-
lems this policy may have produced, it is
clearly preferable to the most frequently
employed alternatives. For example, in
Take Back the Night: Women on Pornogra-
phy, a collection of feminist essays, Dr.
Diana Russell writes that "Pornography is
explicit representations of sexual behavior,
verbal or pictorial, that have as a distin-
guishing characteristic the degrading or
demeaning portrayal of human beings, es-
pecially women." In her contribution to
the same volume, Helen E. Longino defines
pornography as "verbal or pictorial materi-
al which represents or describes sexual
behavior that is degrading or abusive to one
or more of the participants in such a way as
to endorse the degradation." If we were to
accept these definitions, it would seem not
unreasonable to call for the censorship of
pornography. The problem is that these
definitions assume the very point that is
being disputed by those who would defend
pornography. There is a simple way to
illustrate this question-begging procedure.
Would Russell and Longino be willing to
let conservative pro-life advocates define
feminist pro-choice literature as "material
that describes the violation of the rights of
the unborn child in such a way as to
endorse the violation"? Surely these substan-
tive moral conclusions -- that the pro-
choice position endorses the violation of
rights, that the unborn have rights -- are to
be established, if they can be established at
all, by argument and evidence and not by
verbal fiat. Similarly, since the very ques-
tion at issue in recent debates over porno-
graphy is the substantive moral claim that
pornography degrades women, this claim
needs to be supported by reasons and not
by biased definitions.
The fact that there is so much disagree-
ment over the meanings of key terms
creates problems for opponents of por-
nography. For example, a number of writ-
ers have insisted that there's a difference
between pornography and erotica. And yet
no one, to my knowledge, has been able to
provide criteria for distinguishing be-
tween the two that isolates the former
without threatening First Amendment guar-
antees of freedom of speech and expression
with respect to the latter. Erica long's
contribution to a forum on "The Place of
Pornography" published in a recent issue
of Harper's illustrates the lengths some will
go to make the distinction. "Erotica," she
writes, "celebrates the erotic nature of the
human creature, attempts to probe what is
erotic in the human soul and the human
mind, and does so artfully, dramatically.
Pornography, on the other hand, serves
simply as an aid to masturbation, with no
artistic pretensions and no artistic value."
Note the false opposition, as if the only
alternatives are art or masturbation. If
pornography has only a masturbatory intent
and effect, of course it should not be
considered art. But why cannot pornogra-
phy be artistic? Thi5 long does not tell us,
though by linguistic device she pretends to
have proved it cannot. Her view implies
that "artistic pornography" is a self-contra-
dictory expression. In consequence, when
critic and novelist Susan Sontag writes in
defense of the aesthetic value of the porno-
graphic novel The Story of 0, she is contra-
dicting herself, however persuasive her argu-
ments may seem.
Such difficulties are endemic to the enter-
prise of defining pornography, and the
reason is not far to seek. The contentions
that "pornography degrades women," that
"pornography has no artistic value," and
that "pornography is antifemale propa-
ganda" (Susan Brownmiller) are morally
motivated. Those who propose them do so
because of prior moral beliefs about how
women should be treated, about the pur-
pose of art, about the nature of sexual
exploitation. Because the sharp distinctions
between pornography and art are stipula-
tions, they cannot be refuted. But perhaps
the extent to which they are question-
begging is now clear. Equally clear, in
consequence, is that any attempt to toss a
ring around pornography is bound to ap-
pear arbitrary. First, because the way we
think about pornography both partially
determines, and is determined by, our view
of its normative value. And second, be-
cause the term 'pornography' designates a
continuum rather than a dichotomy: a
range of cases across a wide spectrum. At
the very least, pornography involves expli-
cit representations of nudity and/or sexual
activity, and contains elements of fantasy
and exaggeration. It abstracts somewhat
from the normal web of human feelings,
attachments, and circumstances. But any
attempt to pick out one of these features as
the essence of pornography is implausible.
And if a whole cluster of different factors is
involved, there is no special reason to think
that they must all be present, or present to
the same degree, in every instance of por-
nography. To be sure, some pornography
deals in bestiality, the use and abuse of
children, and violence against both men
and women but especially women. Nothing
in what I have written is intended as a
defense of such stuff, and the presence of
these elements is neither necessary nor
sufficient for pornography.
If we reflect upon the basic values of
pleasure, privacy, and freedom that are
placed in jeopardy by censorship, it be-
comes clear that ideologically-motivated
definitions of pornography have implica-
tions that pose a considerable risk to those
values. For these reasons it is preferable to
define pornography in less doctrinaire,
more nearly neutral terms. I shall use the
term 'pornography' to refer to materials
that explicity depict nudity and/or sexual
activity in a manner usually having little or
no artistic or literary value, typically for the
purpose of arousing and entertaining its
audience. This definition too has its draw-
backs, but at least it avoids the forms of
definitional bias identified above. (I do not
know whether it avoids all others.) It does
not make bold claims of artistic or literary
merit on behalf of pornography, yet it does
not rule out the possibility that there is, or
can be, genuinely artistic pornography.
Sex and Ideology
Any assessment of pornography ultimate-
ly must confront our attitudes about sex. A
great deal is made by feminists, in particu-
lar, about the attitudes towards sex and
women embodied in pornography. Since
those who attack pornography are, alas,
often as doctrinaire about sex as they are
about pornography, some clarification is in
order. But first we need some background.
Radical feminists are prone to see such
disparate activities and practices as fashion,
science, prostitution, marriage, and pornog-
raphy as expressions of male hostility and
contempt and thus as manifestations of
male oppression. Bound up with this ten-
dency is another which, while not essential
to feminism, is often found in tandem with
it. Some feminists tend to argue a priori,
ignoring empirical evidence and insisting
that whatever the facts concerning, for
example, exposure to pornography and
violence, pornography is intrinsically bad.
Now, when a priori arguments are put
forward as if they were empirical, as some-
times happens under the pressure of ideo-
logical consistency, the result can be argu-
ments designed to confirm what the arguer
already "knows" to be necessarily correct.
Let's consider an example from the work of
Ann Garry, a philosopher who regards
pornography as morally objectionable on
the grounds that it degrades women. In her
article on "Pornography and Respect for
Women," Garry considers whether it is
possible to have pornography with non-
sexist, morally acceptable content. She be-
lieves there .is nothing in the concept or
definition of pornography to rule out such
a possibility. "Nonsexist pornography,"
she writes, "could show men and women in
roles equally valued by society. Characters
would customarily treat each other with
respect and consideration. There would be
no attempt to treat men or women brutally
or thoughtlessly." Nevertheless, Garry
thinks such nonsexist pornography would
still degrade women. Why? We can imagine
a film in which the main character is a high
ranking female Army officer treated with
respect by both men and women, whose
various sexual encounters are explicitly
depicted. Or consider a film in which the
protagonist is a female urologist who diag-
noses illnesses brilliantly, treats patients
with great sympathy, and also has sex with
them (these examples are Garry's). "But is
the content of such a film," Garry asks,
"morally acceptable if it is shown to a
typical porno audience today?" Her answer
is that "an audience of today is likely to see
the 'respected' urologist and Army officer
as playthings or unusual prostitutes - even
if our intention in showing the film is to
counteract this view." You see, Garry




what a "typical" porno audience is like and
what their reaction will be. This question is
not settled by precise observation and
testing; rather, her theory dictates a priori
the answer she must give. Thus, Garry does
not consider the possibility that the "typ-
ical" audience for pornographic films to-
day consists of heterosexual couples who
rent "adult" (X-rated) videocassettes for
viewing together at home.
I could cite other examples of this retreat
to the a priori, but instead let me quote
Susan Brownmiller, who reduces this kind
of thinking to absurdity. "But does one
need scientific methodology in order to
conclude that the antifemale propaganda
that permeates our nation's cultural output
promotes a climate in which acts of sexual
hostility directed against women are not
only tolerated but ideologically encour-
aged?" The disturbing feature of responses
like these (as, in fairness, Garry herself
points out) is that they raise the suspicion
that it would be beside the point to look for
empirical evidence against them, for their
authors give every appearance of intending
to provide, whatever the facts may be,
accounts that will obviously eliminate from
consideration any attempt to defend por-
nography.
With this background, it is perhaps
easier to understand how the theme of male
oppression actually functions in much radi-
cal feminist polemic. It is meant both to
explain various institutions, activities, and
practices, and to condemn them. In her
examination of radical feminist social and
political philosophy, Alison M. Jaggar
makes this quite clear: "Contemporary
radical feminists ... now perceive most social
interaction between
women and men as




. encounter has sexu-
al overtones and typ-





others thus speak as
though "prostitu-
tion is the arche-
typal relationship of
women to men";
that "pornography by its very nature re-
quires that women be subordinate to men
and mere instruments for the fulfillment of
male fantasies"; and that "to treat a woman
as a sex object is automatically to treat her
as less than fully human."
Rather than try to survey all the consider-
ations that have been put forward for these
claims, let's consider the main point of one
recent and influential attempt to support
the feminist anti-pornography position.
The work of Ann Garry, already referred
to, is representative. "As long as sex is
connected with harm done to women," she
writes, "it will be very difficult not to see
pornography as degrading women." Garry
supports this astonishing view with a com-
plicated argument which focuses on lan-
guage. She claims that the words we use in
our thinking and speaking about sex are
"harm-linked" words. Now, since words
like 'fuck' and 'screw' can be used to
indicate harm, it would appear that our
conception of sex is one in which, in
Garry's words, "the active male screws,
harms, the passive female." Garry is quite
correct to observe that some of the vocab-
ulary of sex can be used to indicate harm:
someone may express hostility by yelling
"fuck you," or convey the idea that he or
she was taken advantage of by speaking of
"getting screwed." But such words are
hardly the only ones we have for speaking
about sex. It seems unlikely that a sensitive
and literate speaker of English would
choose "fuck" or "screw" as his preferred
ways of referring to sexual intercourse. But
even if he did, we would need to know a
great deal about his intentions, background
beliefs, and circumstances before we would
be entitled to conclude that he thought
about sexual intercourse in terms of harm-
ing women. The feminist argument is ser-
iously flawed in its overemphasis on the
context of harm in which sexual language is
sometimes used and its neglect of other
contexts. Their account founders on the
reductive impulse to see everything as a
manifestation of a single, universal phe-
nomenon, male oppression.
Conclusion
To return to the theme which gives the
title to this essay. In recent years, por-
nography has been a topic of discussion in
connection with questions of censorship;
or as an expression of male hostility and
contempt for women; or as an example of
the commercialization of sex; or as a conse-
quence of the weakening of the family unit
or the decline of intimacy in technological
society. But the question of the benefits of
pornography has interest in its own right,
and needs to be more widely discussed. The
idea expressed here, that pornography is
instrumental to experiences which any per-
son may reasonably want, suggests that the
dismissive attitude many people take to-
ward pornography may well be mistaken.
Indeed, when we contemplate those things
that are placed at risk by censorship, we
may find ourselves driven to the conclusion
that our cavalier treatment of pornography
is indefensible.
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